Where a putative class action has been brought against a defendant manufacturer of vehicles that were equipped with an allegedly defective engine, the defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied (1) as to the plaintiff’s chapter 93A and counts of unjust enrichment and a claim for breach of express warranty and (2) allowed as to claims alleging breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, fraudulent omission, and violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
“The plaintiff, Robert Awalt, has brought this putative class action on behalf of himself and others who purchased or leased certain General Motors vehicles for the 2010 through 2014 model years that were equipped with an allegedly defective engine. Awalt claims that the engine consumes an abnormally high amount of oil that exceeds industry standards for reasonable oil consumption and that results in low oil levels, insufficient lubricity levels and damage to internal engine components asserts claims against General Motors, LLC, alleging violations of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93A (Count I), breach of express warranty in violation of Chapter 106 §§2-313 and 2A-210 of the Massachusetts General Laws (Count II), Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability (Count III), Fraudulent Concealment/Omission (Count IV), Unjust Enrichment (Count V), and Breach of the Magnuson Warranty Act -Moss, 15 USC §2301 (Count VI). …
“Awalt alleges that General Motors violated the Massachusetts consumer protection statute, Chapter 93A, by failing to disclose the oil consumption defect to purchasers and lessees of the class vehicles. …
“General Motors argues that the complaint does not adequately allege deceptive conduct and cause because Awalt does not allege that he personally found, relied on, or purchased his vehicle because of any specific General Motors advertisement, nor that General Motors knew of the defect in oil consumption at the time of sale.
“As to the first, Awalt claims that General Motors failed to disclose a serious safety defect that would have influenced it not to enter into the transaction. … It alleges that General Motors sold vehicles with the fuel consumption defect oil, generally advertised its vehicles as safe, numerous drivers of cars with the defect complained of problems related to excessive oil consumption and associated problems, General Motors did not disclose the defect to buyers and advised dealers solutions that I knew would not fix the defect. That is enough at this stage. …
“Regarding the latter, Awalt sufficiently alleges that General Motors was aware of the defect when he purchased his vehicle in 2012. He alleges, for example, that General Motors was aware of numerous consumer complaints about the of oil It also claims that General Motors learned of the defect as early as 2008, when a General Motors engineer acknowledged that it was likely the result of a problem with the piston rings, an investigation followed in 2009, the investigation showed General Motors that oil consumption follows the piston/ring assembly, and General Motors made design changes to the engine prior to its purchase. …
“Count II alleges breach of express warranty. …
“The parties dispute the scope of the warranty coverage, which states that ‘the warranty covers repairs to correct any defect in the vehicle, not slight noises, vibrations or other normal vehicle characteristics related to materials or workmanship. work that occurs during the warranty period.’ … General Motors claims that the alleged design defect is not covered because it only warrants defects in materials and workmanship. In response, Awalt argues that it covers any defect in the vehicle, including those of design. He contends that the warranty language is read to cover “any defect in the vehicle” except “slight noise, vibration, or other normal vehicle characteristics related to materials or workmanship.” Because the defect of oil consumption is not a normal feature of the vehicle related to materials or workmanship, Awalt argues, is not excluded by the “except” clause and is therefore covered by the express warranty.
“Under a plain reading of the ruling, Awalt’s interpretation is not implausible: the phrase “related to materials and workmanship” modifies “other normal characteristics of the vehicle.” Slight noises and vibrations are two examples of “characteristics normal vehicle defects related to materials or workmanship.” Therefore, the provision can reasonably be interpreted to cover “any defect in the vehicle” except (1) slight noise; (2) vibration; or (3) other normal characteristics of the vehicle related to materials or workmanship At the very least, the provision is ambiguous, and any ambiguity should be resolved against General Motors at this stage.
“Accordingly, Awalt may proceed with its breach of express warranty claim. …
“Awalt also alleges breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. …
“Awalt . . . has not identified a specific statement about a particular safety feature that was “partial or ambiguous” such that General Motors was required to disclose the defect to prevent the statements from being misleading. The general promotions referring to the ‘fuel efficiency, safety and reliability is more like a non-actionable childhood and do not trigger the obligation to disclose all safety-related information for all vehicles. Furthermore, Awalt does not allege that it has seen or heard anything more specific than general announcements regarding reliability and durability.
“Therefore, the fraudulent omission claim in Count IV is dismissed. …
“Awalt’s fifth count is for unjust enrichment. General Motors argues that Awalt’s unjust enrichment claim cannot proceed because Massachusetts law bars unjust enrichment claims where there is an express contract and the existence of adequate legal remedies. Although the limited warranty may constitute an express contract between the parties, as General Motors contends, the parties dispute its applicability. Awalt is entitled to assert both claims in the alternative at this point in the litigation . . .
“Count VI alleges a violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (“the MMWA”). …
“General Motors contends that a single named plaintiff such as Awalt cannot maintain a class action claim under the MMWA because the statute requires at least 100 named plaintiffs. Awalt contends that it need not identify 100 plaintiffs because there is federal jurisdiction over the case , including the MMWA claim, under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), which does not contain the numerosity requirement.
“It appears to be an open question whether CAFA overrides the MMWA’s statutory requirement to name 100 plaintiffs. Case law addressing the “interplay between CAFA’s and MMWA’s numerousness requirements is sparse” . . . and district courts have reached inconsistent conclusions. In this district, Judge Kelley recently analyzed available case law and concluded that CFAA cannot be used to circumvent the MMWA’s numerosity requirement. …
“I agree with Judge Kelley’s reasoning and reach the same conclusion for substantially the same well-stated reasons. Awalt’s MMWA class claim is dismissed for failure to meet its numerosity requirement. …
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Class Action Complaint (Dkt. No. 16) is granted in part and denied in part. Counts III, IV, and VI are dismissed.
Awalt v. General Motors, LLC (Lawyers Weekly No. 02-150-23) (9 pages) (O’Toole, J.) (Civil Action No. 21-cv-10111-GAO) (Mar. 31, 2023).
Click here to read the full text of the opinion.
